Punishment can lose its legitimacy if the enforcer can profit from delivering punishment. We examine how justification can promote the legitimacy of punishment in a one-shot sender-receiver game where an independent third party can punish the sender upon seeing whether the sender lied. Most third parties who can profit from punishment punish the senders regardless of how the senders behave. However, when they have to provide explanations for their punishment decisions, significantly more third parties punish senders if and only if senders lie, and senders are also more likely to perceive punishment as legitimate and behave honestly.
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Introduction
Justification is widely required in government and other organizations whose decisions can have broader consequences for others. Legislators in the European Union are legally obliged to justify interventions that affect freedom or property rights. In September 2011, the Department of Health and Human Services (HSS) of the United States began requiring health insurance providers to justify insurance rate increases of 10% or more.
1 Doctors need to offer reasons for prescribing certain costly medications. In large companies and nonprofit organizations, human resources departments must report reasons for hiring and firing employees, and managers need to justify employee evaluations. Justification is particularly important in the court system. In a famous court case, a former Illinois police officer, Drew Peterson, screamed out his innocence right before the verdict, was judged guilty, and was J I T E 1 7 0 sentenced to 38 years in prison for murdering his third wife. 2 In this case, as in many others, the judge needed to offer an explanation along with his sentence.
In view of the pervasive use of justification, it is important to understand how the justification requirement affects decision-making. This paper presents novel experimental evidence that requiring justification could promote the legitimacy of third-party punishment and curb corrupt punishment behavior. Legitimacy refers to the degree of consensus about what (people think) is accepted by others, based on norms or frames about what is valid and appropriate in given situations (Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway, 2006) . In this paper, we assume that punishment based on norm violations is more legitimate than punishment independent of norm violations.
Whether punishment is perceived to be legitimate determines how effectively it can signal social norms and promote conformity (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2006; Andrighetto et al., 2013; Faillo, Grieco, and Zarri, 2013; Xiao, 2013c) . Compared with the implicated stakeholders, a third party's judgment is less likely to be influenced by negative emotions such as vengeance and anger (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Cubitt et al., 2011; Tan and Xiao, 2012, 2013) .
3 Punishment decisions in modern societies are thus usually made and implemented by independent third parties such as a court to ensure their legitimacy.
On the other hand, the legitimacy of punishment is sensitive to the nature of the third-party mechanism (e.g., Tyran and Feld, 2006 ; see more papers reviewed in Xiao, 2013c) . For example, when punishment involves depriving violators of resources such as money or labor, those resources can become profit for the enforcers. Profit from punishment could motivate third-party enforcers to impose punishment for their own benefit rather than as a way to maintain social order. Such profit-seeking punishment is perhaps most common in corrupt societies. Xiao (2013a) shows that when third parties can profit, many of them impose punishment regardless of how the recipients behave. Consequently, people no longer perceive punishment as legitimate, and punishment fails to signal a norm violation.
Previous research on punishment, however, has not investigated how the pressure to justify imposing punishment may influence the legitimacy of punishment. The effect of justification pressure on judgment and decisions has been discussed extensively in the literature on accountability, although most of those studies are unable to distinguish the pure effect of justification from other confounding factors such as identifiability. 4 In his seminal work on accountability, Tetlock (1985) argues that people make decisions based on simple heuristics. When they are required to justify 2 See http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/peterson-screams-38-years-murder-1856 3027.
3 One key feature of an independent third party is that his material payoff is independent of the decisions of the implicated stakeholders (see Leibbrandt and López-Pérez, 2012) . Such categorization distinguishes a third party from centralized punishers randomly chosen or elected among the implicated players (e.g., see Baldassarri and Grossman, 2011) . 4 For instance, Vieider (2011 Vieider ( , 2012 finds that when people have to explain their decisions to recipients face-to-face, they exert more effort or become less loss-averse. One exception is Xiao (2013b) , who excludes identifiability and examines the pure their actions but do not know audiences' view, they try to anticipate the objections of potential critics. Xiao (2013b) provide experimental evidence that pure pressure for justification can enhance the norm salience by encouraging one to think about what the audience thinks. As a result, the individual becomes more sensitive to any deviation from that expectation. We thus hypothesize that enforcers are more likely to punish consistently with social norms when there is a justification requirement. Requiring justification can curb corrupt punishment behavior and promote legitimate punishment, even when the decisions are anonymous and there is no material consequence for poor justification.
To test our hypothesis, we adopt an experiment based on a sender-receiver game by Gneezy (2005) widely used to study cheating behavior. We extend this game by introducing an independent third party who can punish the sender after observing whether the sender has sent a true or a false message to the receiver about which of two options will earn the receiver a higher payoff.
Our experiment is built on the experiment reported in Xiao (2013a) . In the baseline nonprofitable-punishment treatment (NPP), the punishment decision of the third party is totally independent of the decision itself -he only receives a fixed payment for the task. In the profitable-punishment treatment (PP), the third party earns extra money if he punishes the sender, regardless of whether the sender has sent a false message to the receiver. Xiao (2013a) reports that people are less likely to view punishment as signaling a norm violation in PP than in NPP. In this paper, we introduce a justification treatment. Compared to PP, the only difference in the justification treatment is that the third party must explain his decision (whether to punish or not punish the sender).
We define legitimate punishment as occurring if and only if a sender violates a truth-telling norm. We find that justification increases legitimate punishment to a level similar to the NPP treatment. Moreover, compared with the PP treatment, the senders are significantly more likely to tell the truth in the justification treatment, and the receivers are more likely to perceive punishment as signaling a norm violation. These findings support our hypothesis and shed light on the underlying mechanisms of the role of justification in legal enforcement and policymaking.
To the best of our knowledge, the study closest to ours is Engel and Zhurakhovska (2013) . In a four-person public-goods experiment, a standalone third party could punish players, either with verbal explanations (in private or in public) or without any explanation. They find that, in treatments where third parties need to provide verbal explanations, monetary punishment decreases, yet contributions are on average the same as in the treatment where no explanation is provided for punishment decisions. While their paper argues that verbal punishment can be a substitute for monetary punishment, ours focuses on the legitimacy of punishment. In particular, we argue that the requirement of providing explanations for punishment decisions decreases profitseeking punishment and restores the norm-communication function of punishment. effect of the external pressure due to the requirement of justification. The author finds that it can reduce selfish behavior, even in one-shot environments. J I T E 1 7 0
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experiment design and procedure. Section 3 reports the results, and section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
The Experiment

Design
To provide clean evidence to study how justification promotes legitimate third-party punishment decisions, we design our experiment on the basis of three one-shot sender-receiver games with the same payoff structures first used in Xiao (2013a) (see Table 1 ). The instructions are in Appendix A.1.
Participants in each game, modified according to Gneezy (2005) , play one of the three roles, called sender, receiver, and third party. The receiver must choose between two options, A and B, without knowing what the payoffs will be (see Table 1 for the payoffs of each game). Before the receiver makes the choice, the sender sends one of two messages to the receiver. The sender, who is fully informed about the monetary payoffs, must tell the receiver either "Option A earns you more money than action B" or "Option B earns you more money than action A." As in Gneezy (2005) , we designed the payoffs of the two options so that one option yields a higher payoff for the sender than the other option. Receivers do not know this is the case.
The task of the third party in each game is to decide whether or not to punish the sender after observing his message. The punishment reduces the sender's payoff by 50%, depending on the later choice by the receiver. Finally, the receiver makes her decision between options A and B after observing the sender's message and the payoff-cut decisions of the third party. Subjects were not informed of the outcome of each game during the experiment. Thus, the design did not allow for learning. At the end of the experiment, one game was randomly chosen as the payoff game, and each participant was informed of the result of that game.
In our experiment, in addition to senders' behavior, the third party's decision can be affected by other concerns such as efficiency or inequality between the sender and the receiver. 5 We designed our experiment to minimize such confounds. First, we do not inform the third party of the sender and receiver payoffs in each game. The only information he knows is whether or not the sender has sent a true message. Second, the payoff of the third party is determined by a random number from the four numbers in the payoff table with equal probabilities. Moreover, a third party learns his earnings only at the end of the experiment. Neither the sender nor the receiver knows the earnings of their matched third party throughout the experiment. All these are common knowledge to all players in the game.
Our experiment consists of three treatments: nonprofitable punishment (NPP), profitable punishment (PP), and justification (J). Data from the first two treatments have been discussed in Xiao (2013a) . In this paper, we focus on the comparison between the justification treatment and the other two treatments. The sequence of the experiment is identical across treatments except for the decisions of third parties. In the NPP treatment, a third party makes his decision without any justification and earns a fixed amount of money independent of the decision. In the PP treatment, a third party can earn an extra 50% of his random payoff by punishing the sender. This is common knowledge for all subjects.
The justification treatment differs from the PP treatment only in that after a third party has made the punishment decision, he has to provide an explanation for his decision. The message is revealed to the other two paired subjects only at the end of the experiment if that game has been randomly selected to pay out. This means that during the experiment, a receiver could learn the decision of the third party, but not the message. The difference in third-party punishment behavior between this treatment and that in the PP treatment offers us direct evidence about the extent to which justification decreases illegitimate third-party punishment.
Procedure
We conducted our experiment at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . A total of 288 students from Carnegie Mellon University and Pittsburgh University participated as subjects (one treatment only for each subject). We used 29 groups of three in the NPP treatment, 30 groups in the PP treatment, and 37 groups in the justification treatment.
At the beginning of an experiment, subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned a role, and the role was fixed throughout the experiment. To compare the different possible reactions of the same third party facing true versus false messages, we let subjects play three sender-receiver games with different payoff structures. All sessions began with game 1, followed by either game 2 or game 3, based on a random order to avoid order effects. After the end of one game, we randomly rematched the subjects within a session to minimize learning and effects from repeated interactions. At the end of the experiment, one game was randomly chosen J I T E 1 7 0 as the payoff round. Each subject was paid privately according to the outcome in that game.
Results
In all sessions we ran game 1 first. This enabled us to test whether our findings were robust to inexperienced subjects. We found that decisions in game 1 were similar to those in game 2 and game 3. Hence, we report data pooling from all three games in the following analysis.
Third-Party Decisions
The figure plots the distribution of different types of third parties in all treatments. We sort third parties into one of the following categories based on their punishment behavior in three games: (1) punish if and only if a sender sends a false message (legitimate punishment); (2) always punish regardless of the nature of a message (always punishment); and (3) exhibit punishment behavior that does not fall into either one of the aforementioned categories (others). We focus on observations from third parties who have seen both true and false messages.
As shown in the figure, in the NPP treatment, more than 50% (15 out of 27) of third parties are legitimate. In the PP treatment, in contrast, less than 5% (1 out
Figure
Distributions of Third-Party Punishment Types by Treatment
Notes: The data include only third parties who experienced both false messages and true messages. NPP is short for the nonprofitable-punishment treatment, in which third parties could not monetarily benefit from punishment. PP is short for the profitablepunishment treatment, in which that the third party could benefit from punishment. J is short for the justification treatment, in which third parties must justify their choices to senders and receivers. of 22) of third parties impose legitimate punishment, and the difference is both economically and statistically significant ( a two-sided Z-test, p < 0.01). Most third parties (17 out of 22) always punish the sender regardless of the message sent in the PP treatment, but much fewer do so in the NPP treatment (6 out of 27, a two-sided Z-test, p < 0.01).
When third parties have to justify their punishment decisions, they are much less likely to seek profitable punishment, even though there are no material consequences of justification. In the justification treatment, 40.63% (13 out of 32) of third parties punish if and only if a sender sends a false message. This proportion is much higher than in the PP treatment (a two-sided Z-test, p < 0.01) and is much closer to the NPP treatment. Compared with PP treatment, significantly fewer third parties in the justification treatment always punish regardless of whether the message is true or false (31.25% versus 77.27%, a two-sided Z-test, p < 0.01). Although more third parties in the justification treatment always punish than in the NPP treatment (28.13% versus 22.22%), the difference is not statistically significant (a two-sided Z-test, p = 0.18).
An overview of the justification messages written by the third parties also suggests that the third parties indeed justify their punishment decisions based on norm violations even though all the messages and decisions are anonymous and they have the freedom to write anything they want. Appendix A.2 lists all messages third parties sent to both senders and receivers in the justification treatment.
In particular, when asked to explain "why [they] did not punish a sender," third parties predominantly wrote, "since he tells the truth" or "since he did not send the wrong message" (32 out of 34). Only one third party wrote "since he lied."
When asked to explain "why [they] punished a sender," over 70% of the time (52 out of 74) third parties wrote that "the sender has lied about the message." About 9.5% of the answers were the opposite, i.e., the sender was punished because he told the truth (7 out of 74). Only about 8% of the time (6 out of 74) do third parties explicitly mention that they could profit from punishment. These results suggest that, even though the messages are anonymous, third parties seem to be averse to providing reasons that others might disapprove of.
Sender Decisions
Senders' choices of whether to lie can show us their perception of the legitimacy of punishment. Sutter (2009) argues that the definition of deception should depend on the intention to deceive, not on the message sent (i.e., whether the message is the same as suggested by a computer). We adopt this suggestion and define deception in this paper as any decision that the sender expects to lead the receiver to choose the low-payoff option. At the end of the experiment, after all players have decided their actions, we elicit senders' beliefs regarding whether the receivers will follow their messages. Thus, lies in our experiment include the cases where a sender sends a false message and expects the receiver to follow the message (F_F) and the cases J I T E 1 7 0 where a sender sends a true message and expects the receiver not to follow the message (T_NF).
If senders expect punishment to be legitimate and believe it is imposed to enforce the norm of honesty, senders will send true messages and expect receivers to follow them (T_F). On the other hand, if senders expect third-party punishment to be driven by profit, they will send a false message if they believe the receiver will follow the message (F_F), or a true message if they believe the receiver will not follow the message (T_NF) (see Xiao, 2013a , for theoretical analysis in detail).
We report the descriptive data on senders' decisions and beliefs in Table 2 . The right panel reports the messages by the senders conditional on their beliefs. The left panel reports the aggregate frequency of lies, which is the sum of F_F and T_NF messages from the right panel. Table 2 shows that the frequency of lying is approximately 20% higher in the PP than in the NPP treatment (55.56% versus 34.48%). In the justification treatment, however, the frequency of lying drops to almost the same level as in the NPP treatment (34.23% versus 34.48%). Relative to the PP treatment, the frequency of lies is significantly lower in the justification treatment (55.56% versus 34.23%).
To provide statistic evidences for the treatment effects, we calculate the percentage of lies (T_NF or F_F) for each sender. We find that the justification effect is statistically significant. In particular, senders lie significantly less in the justification Notes: T_NF: a sender sends a true message and expects the receiver not to follow; F_F: a sender sends a false message and expects the receiver to follow; T_F: a sender sends a true message and expects the receiver to follow; F_NF: a sender sends a false message and expects the receiver not to follow. Notes: In the experiment, game 1 is always the first game and we only randomize the order of game 2 and game 3. We tried to include the interaction term between game 3 and the period variable and found it is not significant, which suggests that the order of the games presented does not matter. We hence drop this variable from the regression. The number in the parenthesis is the standard error.
treatment than in the PP treatment (34.48% versus 55.56%, a two-sided MannWhitney test, p < 0.05), and about the same as in the NPP treatment (34.23% versus 34.48%, a two-sided Mann-Whitney test, p = 1.00). The results suggest that senders are more likely to expect punishment to be legitimate and less likely to lie when they know that the enforcers are required to provide explanations for their decisions.
We also conducted random-individual-effect probit regression analyses of senders' behavior. Table 3 reports the regression results. The dependent variable of the first regression is whether a sender sent a true message and expects his matched receiver to follow his message (T_F). The dependent variable of the second regression is whether a sender has lied (F_F and T_NF). The explanatory variables in both regressions include dummies for the PP and J treatments (baseline: NPP treatment), and dummies of a specific game.
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Results from both panels are highly consistent with our previous findings. Relative to the NPP treatment, senders lie significantly more in the PP treatment when third parties could profit from punishment. However, the frequency of deception falls back to a level comparable to the NPP treatment when senders learn that justification needs to be provided by third parties. Consistent with previous findings (Gneezy, 2005) , senders lie more in both game 1 and game 3, where the incentives to do so are higher.
Receiver Decisions
We summarize receivers' decisions in Table 4 . The descriptive data show that, if the senders are not punished by the third party, the receivers predominantly follow the senders' choices across all three treatments. We next focus on treatment effects in cases where punishment is imposed.
We can infer receivers' perception of the punishment legitimacy from their decisions on whether to follow sender messages when the third party punishes the sender. If receivers expect punishment to be legitimate, they should not follow the messages when there is a punishment. On the other hand, if they think the punishment decisions of the third parties are profit-oriented and hence norm-irrelevant, they will decide whether to follow the message according to their initial belief about whether senders will send a true or a false message. Thus, the difference in the rate of message following when the receiver observes a punishment reflects the difference in the receiver's perception of the legitimacy of punishment. The more likely a receiver views punishment as legitimate, the less likely she will follow sender's message when it is punished (see details in Xiao, 2013a) .
In 85.71% (42 out of 49) cases of the NPP treatment, receivers do not follow messages if the sender is punished. By contrast, in the PP treatment, if they observe the third party punishing the sender, then receivers make either decision with equal probability (41 decisions follow the message, and 40 decisions do not). The justification requirement recovers the receivers' perception of the punishment's legitimacy. When the third party punishes the sender in the justification treatment, about 72.60% (53 out of 73 cases) of the time receivers do not follow the message of the senders, which is a sharp increase of nearly 25% compared to that in the PP treatment.
To compare these percentages statistically, we average out the percentage of decisions across three games for each receiver upon receiving a punished message. We find receivers in the justification treatment are less likely to follow senders' advice than those in the PP treatment (24.06% versus 49.38%, a two-sided MannWhitney test, p < 0.01) when they know that the sender is punished. Although the percentage of message following in the justification treatment is still higher than that in the NPP treatment, the difference is no longer statistically significant (24.06% versus 14.86%, a two-sided Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.50).
We also conducted regression analysis of receivers' behavior (see Table 5 ). The dependent variable is whether the receiver follows the sender's message when observing the sender is punished. The baseline is PP treatment. The regression results are consistent with the nonparametric analysis. Compared with PP treatment, receivers are much less likely to follow the senders' message in the NPP and the justification treatment. The coefficient of NPP is not significantly different from that of justification ( p = 0.204).
Concluding Remarks
We study the pure effect of justification on third-party punishment decisions, using a controlled laboratory sender-receiver game experiment. The results support the hypothesis that, when punishment is profitable for the enforcers, requiring justification can balance the scale by promoting legitimate punishment, even if there are no reputation or material consequences for poor justification. This level of balance is comparable to the case where a third party does not benefit from punishment. As a result, profitable punishment is more effective in promoting honest behavior when justification is required.
The fact that justification promotes legitimate punishment even in the presence of monetary temptation can be applied to policymakers, who must explain or justify policy decisions. Traditionally, policy explanations are merely perceived as information displayed for the public's benefit. However, the results from our experiment indicate that providing explanations can also change the behavior of decision-makers in a direction more consistent with the perceived social norm. Hence, an obligation to constantly provide justifications to the public could be a low-cost way to combat corruption, as a supplement to conventional mechanisms such as punishment.
Our results also suggest the importance of designing appropriate compensation packages for the law enforcers. Our experimental data clearly support the claim that how law enforcers are paid strongly influences the public's perception of the legitimacy of punishment. As discussed in Xiao (2013c) , the choice between a guaranteed, fixed payment and performance-based payment has a tricky trade-off. On the one hand, some scholars have suggested that paying a high salary reduces the temptation for law enforcers to earn extra money by exerting their power (Abbink, 2006) . On the other hand, a fixed, guaranteed payment decreases the incentives to convict guilty defendants. Performance-based payment can incentivize enforcers to work harder to catch violators. However, it also might distort the enforcer's incentive to convict innocent defendants to pursue profit, which could deteriorate the public's perception of the legal system. This challenge opens avenues for future research, such as comparing the costs and benefits of different compensation packages, and evaluating the effect of introducing nonmonetary incentives. This paper shows that the requirement of justification can be an effective solution to build into compensation plans to overcome the dilemma of incentives and promote the legitimacy of punishment.
Appendix
A.1 Experiment Instructions
Instructions (Person 1)
General Information
Thank you for coming! You've earned $5 for showing up on time, and the instructions explain how you can make decisions and earn more money. So please read these instructions carefully! There should be no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have a question, please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. This session consists of three rounds. At the beginning of each round, the computer will randomly group one Person 1 with one Person 2 and one Person 3. Thus, your counterpart in each round will change randomly throughout the experiment. No one will ever be informed of the identity of the two counterparts.
Below are the decision tasks in each round. After Person 2's decision, a new round starts. Each participant will be randomly paired with another two participants. Each round will proceed in the same way.
You will not know the result of each round during the experiment. In the end of the experiment, one round will be randomly chosen to be your payoff round. Every participant will be informed of the result of that round. Both Person 1 and Person 2 will also see Person 3's message that explains his/her decision. Each participant will be paid accordingly.
To repeat the key parts of this experiment, Person 1 and Person 2 will earn the amounts specified in the option chosen by Person 2. However, Person 2 will never know what amounts were actually offered in the option not chosen (that is, he or she will never know whether Person 1's message was true or not). Moreover, Person 2 will never know the amounts to be paid to Person 1 according to the different options. Also, Person 2 and Person 1 will never know what payoff Person 3 randomly received. Person 1's earnings will also be affected by Person 3's payoff-cut decision. Person 3's earning will be increased if he/she assigns the payoff-cut to Person 1. Person 3 must write a message to explain his/her decision and the explanation must be related to Person 1's behavior. The message will be viewed by Person 1 and Person 2 at the end of the experiment only if that round is randomly chosen to be the payoff round. Person 3 will lose all earnings from the experiment and receive only the show up bonus if he/she did not write a message to explain her/his decision or if the explanation is not written in the required format.
Your ID ________
The next several subsections outline the procedure of the experiment and the computer screens when Person 1, Person 2, and Person 3 make their decisions.
A.2 Third-Party Messages
We asked the subjects in the role of third parties write a message to explain their decisions. We pool all the answers (three by each third party) from the three games and put them into three categories: reasons about why they punish the sender, why they do not punish, and other, unidentifiable reasons. Despite that, we discourage empty messages; there are three occasions on which subjects did not provide any explanations. Therefore, the total number of messages is 108.
Reasons why the sender should be punished (74) (1) Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because they sent the Message A which is not true. Reason 2: The sender has told the truth (1):
(107) Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 chose Message A which is untrue.
Reason 3: Unclear on the game (1):
(108) I did not assign the payoff cut because I don't even get what's going on in this experiment.
